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ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the roles of institutions in facilitating or
impeding the creation of new technological pathways in different
countries. It is argued that the successful invention, innovation
and diffusion of new technologies require the co-evolution of
relevant institutions. It is argued that informal institutions, through
their impact on people’s beliefs, perceptions and consequential
behaviour, crucially influence whether formal institutions co-
evolve with technological development and changing
circumstances. At the same time, the rigidity of the pre-existing
formal institutional arrangements impacts on whether agents can
stimulate their co-evolution with the introduction of new
technologies. These arguments are explored by comparing the
creation of new wind power technologies in Britain and Germany
since the 1970s.
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Introduction
This paper is focused on the roles of agents and the interactions between them and insti-
tutions in the creation of new technological pathways. This follows the recognition that,
while there is some considerable agreement among scholars on the importance that
should be attached to the roles of institutions with respect to economic and industrial
development, there remains little analysis on either how or why institutions interact
specifically with technological development on which much industrial development is
based. In this paper, we seek to address this lacuna by examining empirically the signifi-
cance of the co-evolution or lack thereof, of different types of institutions with technologi-
cal development.
The main arguments in this paper are that first, new technological path creation is
usually instigated by knowledgeable agents in the context of historical institutional
arrangements. Second, the co-evolution of these institutional arrangements with the intro-
duction of new technologies is important in enabling new technological path creation.
Third, the national and regional differences in institutional ensembles and their co-
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evolution with technological change are a significant reason why new technological path
creation finds more support in some countries and regions than others.
In the past two divergent views can be found offering explanations of how new tech-
nologies are created in the first instance. In much of literature on entrepreneurship, for
example, the introduction of new technologies is attributed to the actions of exceptional
and specific individuals (see Gartner, 1988) operating within the context of high
degrees of freedom. In contrast, the canonical approach to path dependence theory
emphasizes the probability of the evolution of technological trajectories towards lock-in
because of contingent events, network externalities and increasing returns. These argu-
ments provide little scope for unfettered freedom of action by entrepreneurs. Instead,
new technological pathways are said to be created either by chance or as a result of
severe external economic shocks (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985).
Martin (2010) makes the case for moving beyond the limitations of these two polarized
arguments to explain the introduction of new technologies from an evolutionary perspec-
tive. There is a need to do this because many historical technological changes have been
introduced in the absence of economic shocks and, even where external economic shocks
have taken place, reactions to them by similar types of agent have been different in differ-
ent places.
With respect to agency in the creation of new technologies, Garud and Karnøe (2001)
and Simmie (2012) have argued that new technological pathways have often been created
and diffused by reflexive and knowledgeable agents. This paper, therefore, seeks first to
identify and explain, from an evolutionary theoretical perspective, the roles of agents in
the processes of new technological path creation.
The second key question arising from the canonical exposition of path dependence
exemplified by David (1985), Arthur (1989, 1990) and Vergne and Durand (2010) is
that they have defined the concept in purely economic terms. But scholars such as Rip
and Kemp (1998), Geels (2002) and Essletzbichler (2012) have argued that this approach
is too narrow and that explanations of path-dependent technological trajectories should be
situated in the wider system in which the technology is embedded. This argument is made
clearly by Martin (2008) in saying that technological change is an inherently socio-cultural
activity that is deeply dependent on the institutional setting within which it takes place
(Martin, 2008).
Just as path-dependent technological trajectories are intertwined with their institutional
settings so new path creation is also influenced by historical institutional arrangements
and their co-evolution or failure to co-evolve with the introduction of new technologies.
Institutions form an important filter for the perceptions of agents with respect to inter-
actions between technological trajectories and their wider environment. Because of this
filter, agents may or may not see possibilities for technological development, the need
for institutional co-evolution and the potential for action. Co-evolution is said to occur
as two or more parts of a field evolve together, not perfectly, but with slippage across
time and space. In doing so, the co-evolving parts may both enable and constrain each
other through feedback that can be negative or positive (Garud & Karnøe, 2001).
In the light of these arguments, this paper also seeks to explore the interactions between
agents and institutions in the creation of a new technological pathway. This is illustrated
by following through time the evolution of interactions between agents and institutional
arrangements, as the new wind turbine technologies were being created in Britain and
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Germany, and their subsequent co-evolution or lack thereof. This builds upon previous
work on the evolution of the same technology in both Denmark and the U.S. (Garud &
Karnøe, 2003; Simmie, 2012, 2013). Garud and Karnøe (2003), in particular, have illus-
trated the significance of differences in the confluence of agency and institutions in
both the failure to create successful ‘breakthroughs’ in wind turbine technologies in the
U.S., compared with the bottom-up approach of ‘bricolage’ adopted in Denmark. In
this study, similar differences in success and failure between Germany and Britain are
found. An explanation for such differences is sought in detailed analyses of the inter-
actions between specific agents and institutions in the two countries.
Thirdly, therefore, it is argued that differences in institutional arrangements between
countries and regions are a significant reason why new technological path creation takes
place more easily in some localities than others. Evidence of the impacts of institutional
differences at the level of nation states has been provided with respect to economic
policy within different varieties of capitalism by Hall and Soskice (2001), and with
respect to national systems of innovation by Lundvall (1995) and Freeman and Soete
(1997). At the local level, Gertler (2010) argues that different ensembles of institutions
contribute to the different pathways of economic development observed in different
regional settings.
Following this introduction, the paper is divided into four substantive sections followed
by a summary of the findings and conclusions. First, there is an exposition of the theor-
etical approach adopted to explain the interactions between agents and institutions in new
technological path creation. Second, there is a short methodological section that outlines
briefly how the original empirical data were collected and analysed. Third, this is followed
by a three-part section comparing the historical path-dependent development of wind
turbine technologies in Britain and Germany between 1970 and 2015, followed by individ-
ual parts that focus on the countries separately. In Britain, it is shown how institutional
hysteresis impeded the development of the new technology. In contrast, in Germany, it
is shown that institutional co-evolution was a key contributor to the creation of the
new technological pathway in wind turbine technology. The fourth section shows the
resulting impacts of these differing evolutionary histories that have produced different
outcomes in the industrial landscapes of the two countries. A concluding section draws
these findings together to argue that institutional differences and evolutionary processes
provide a significant part of the explanation for both failures and successes in new tech-
nological path creation.
Institutions and new technological path creation
Little is known so far about the specific interactions between agents, institutions and new
technological path creation. The literature on the roles of institutions with respect to inno-
vation systems, for example, while recognizing their importance in principle, has not yet
reached either a settled definition of institutions or agreement on what precisely their roles
are in technological innovation.
Nelson (1993) regards institutions as the legislation and organization of education,
training, funding and research frameworks that differ at the national level, and therefore
form the basis of distinctive national systems of innovation. In contrast, Edquist and
Johnson (1997) define institutions as behavioural patterns such as routines, norms,
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shared expectations and morals. Yet another perspective is proposed by Lundvall and
Maskell (2000). They argue that institutions develop from and co-evolve with solving
specific problems in production through processes of interactive learning. With respect
to agents, relational geographers have argued that institutions are made as a result of
‘stabilizations of mutual expectations and correlated interaction’ (Bathelt & Glückler,
2014, p. 341) between agents.
Despite these widely differing definitions of institutions, there is widespread agree-
ment that technical change also requires complementary institutional change and that
new technologies may not be supported by existing institutional arrangements but need
to be so (Freeman & Perez, 2008; Nelson, 1998). As a result, for radical innovation to
succeed ‘institutional and regulatory changes must take place’ (Rip & Kemp, 1998,
p. 364).
There is also the widely held view that existing institutions often impede the introduc-
tion of new technologies. North, for example, views institutions as constraints. This leads
him to argue that the concept of path dependence can be applied to both technological and
institutional change (North, 1991). This view is echoed by Setterfield who suggests that
institutions are evolving, non-optimal path-dependent phenomena (1993). Furthermore,
he regards the relationships between institutions and the economy as naturally ‘hysteretic’
(Setterfield, 1993, p. 761).
Thus, in much of the original literature on the relationships between technology and
institutions, it is argued that path dependence and lock-in of the former is deeply
enmeshed with hysteresis and a lack of change in the latter. Institutions are, therefore,
regarded as playing a significant role among the various forces underlying the path depen-
dence of technological trajectories.
Due to its clarity of definition, North’s taxonomy of institutions is adopted as the basis
of the empirical work in this study. North’s taxonomy distinguishes between:
1. ‘Informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct)
2. Formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)’ (North, 1991, p. 97)
3. ‘Organisational forms of institutions (groups bound by some common purpose to
achieve objectives)’ (North, 1996, p. 5).
This taxonomy is also able to accommodate investigation of the scales or levels at which
institutions are formed and the impacts of the differential levels of power associated with
those different levels. Hudson (2004), for example, refers to processes of institution build-
ing that involve inﬂuences from macro-structures, such as the particular variety of capit-
alism found in different countries (Hall & Soskice, 2001), that are transferred to the
individual level through institutions in a process of downward causation. At the same
time, there are also processes of upward causation (Hodgson, 2003) in which micro-prac-
tices are translated into broader institutional arrangements that affect the macro-level.
Differences of this nature are illustrated in the relationships between agents and insti-
tutions in the creation of their respective new pathways in wind turbine technology in
Britain and Germany.
With respect to categories of agents that are relevant to the creation of new technologi-
cal pathways, three types are identified for the purposes of operationalizing this study.
These are:
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1. Agents embedded in civil society: including citizens, consumers, activists in social
movements, inventors, innovators and small-scale entrepreneurs.
2. Agents from the industrial landscape: including incumbent firms.
3. Policy-makers: including politicians, bureaucrats and government agencies.
In this taxonomy, it is possible for an agent to play more than one role. So, the same agent
may be an activist in a social movement, work for an electricity-generating company and
be an adviser to governments. There may also be tensions and inconsistencies in such mul-
tiple roles.
Some agents possess or develop the capacity to stimulate institutional change. Garud,
Hardy, and Maguire (2007) identify what they call ‘institutional entrepreneurs’. These
are actors who have an interest in particular institutional arrangements and who leverage
resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones. Social movements can
also play a key role as collective agents of institutional change (Doblinger & Soppe, 2013;
Vasi, 2011). In the context of the climate change debate, environmental groups help to
bundle resources to gain an influential role in creating favourable social and institutional
arrangements for the introduction of new technologies. Their primary mechanism is the
building of pressure on formal governmental institutions.
In the light of the above discussions, the basic arguments of this paper may be summed
up as follows. First, within a multi-layered perspective on the evolution of new technologies,
these are argued to be created in the first instance by reflexive, knowledgeable agents.
Second, these agents are at the same time both embedded in and in continuous reciprocal
relationships with institutions. Third, the relevant institutions must co-evolve with the intro-
duction of their technological innovations for them to diffuse through the economy.
From these arguments, it follows that path dependence and rigidity in both techno-
logical trajectories and institutions can impede the introduction and diffusion of tech-
nological innovations. Within the taxonomy of institutions, it is also argued, fourth,
that informal institutions provide more fertile and less rigid environments for the gen-
eration of new ideas than formal and organizational institutions. The norms and beliefs
that constitute informal institutions influence everyday behaviours and the willingness
of individuals such as entrepreneurs to consider new ideas and to seek change. Thus, it
is argued that informal institutions through their impact on the behaviours of agents
influence the degree to which they press for formal institutional arrangements to co-
evolve with technological developments or changing circumstances. At the same
time, the degree of openness of formal and organizational institutions impacts on
the ability of agents to instigate institutional co-evolution. These arguments are sum-
marized diagrammatically in Figure 1.
Fifth, this conceptual framework is focused primarily on seeking to understand the
need for institutional co-evolution with agent instigated technological change. But it is
also recognized that the possibilities for the existence of variations in institutional ensem-
bles at both different interaction and geographic levels offer potential ways of explaining
how and why new technological path creation tends to take place in some geo-political
spaces rather than others. The comparative analysis of Britain and Germany, presented
in this paper, provides support for the argument that differences in the institutional
ensembles, particularly at national geographic levels, help to explain observed differences
in the creation or failure to create new technologies in the two countries.
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Research methods
The above arguments have been applied to the analysis of the evolution of wind turbine
technology in Germany and Britain. For reasons of manageability and focus, the study
concentrates on the period from the earliest industrial development in the 1970s to
about 2010. The shifting regime dynamics and changed landscape since then are also con-
sidered in the light of the findings.
The two countries were chosen because in relation to the number of patent applications
they showed comparable rates of wind-related inventive activity in the early years (Essletz-
bichler, 2012; OECD, 2013). Companies in both countries were working at the technologi-
cal frontiers of wind turbine development. Yet, by the early 1990s Germany was reaching
for world leadership both in the industrial production and in the diffusion of this technol-
ogy whereas no wind turbine producing manufacturer was left in Britain (Musgrove, 2010;
Ohlhorst, 2008). They, therefore, constitute a leading and laggard case in wind technology-
based industrial path creation.
Germany is globally known for its supportive renewable energy policies but the ques-
tion why, despite similar technological pre-conditions, despite excellent natural resources,
and despite being subject to the same external shocks, agents in Britain did not seek and
succeed in putting in place a similar institutional support for this fledgling industry is the
key interest of this study.
The qualitative, comparative research design enabled a focus on the perspective of parti-
cipating agents on the development as such and on their interactions with the institutional
setting. A total of 36 respondents were interviewed in a semi-structured format between
January and November 2015. A pilot study with four academics with expertise in the
fields of path dependency, institutions and the wind energy industry in Germany and
Figure 1. Institutions and new path creation.
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Britain was followed by the main fieldwork period consisting of 32 interviews with industry
experts. Interviewees were chosen on the basis of their insight and expertise in the develop-
ment of the wind energy industry, many were current or former holders of influential pos-
itions in organizations that shaped the industry or the institutional setting. Following
preliminary assessment and the pilot study, a small number of key organizations and indi-
viduals were approached; further contacts were gained through snowballing.
The resulting textual data were used both immediately in a content analysis and textual
analysis using Nvivo and as signposts towards relevant secondary datasets and sources.
These data and the study of documents were then combined resulting in the analysis of
the role of institutions for the path-dependent development of the wind energy industry
in Germany and Britain
New path creation in wind power technology in Britain and Germany
1970–2010
Brief history
The following three-part section presents the findings of the analysis. The first of these
gives a short comparative introduction to the historical path-dependent techno-industrial
development of the wind energy industry in Britain and Germany between 1970 and 2010.
The second and third sections present the findings on new technological path creation
separately for the two countries.
The oil crises of the 1970s had left most countries in a position where the supply of
energy sources was seen as insecure and a focus on locally available sources was supported.
For many countries, including Britain and Germany, this meant a concentration on oil/gas
and nuclear as well as coal (Simmie, Sternberg, & Carpenter, 2014). The common techno-
economic paradigm was that energy generation had to take place on a large scale. This was
reflected in the attitudes in both countries towards experiments in the creation of renew-
able forms of electrical energy generation. Government institutions in both countries
initially adopted a ‘breakthrough’ approach to research in wind turbine technologies.
Both provided research funding for the development of large-scale experimental turbines.
In Germany, construction companies were supported by the Federal Research Ministry to
build a very large turbine with a blade diameter of 100 m and an output of 3 MW known as
the GroWiAn. The declared aim was to create a ‘breakthrough’ technology. The exper-
iment was a financial and technological disaster. In Britain, the Department of Energy
adopted a similar approach. A consortium of construction companies, Vertical Axis
Wind Turbines, was funded to conduct R&D on large, ‘breakthrough’ vertical axis wind
turbines. These hit technical problems and the funding was discontinued. Both govern-
ments, therefore, initially invested in attempts to produce ‘breakthrough’ large-scale
plants and machinery (Musgrove, 2010).
[…] I think that is partly around market set-ups, so that is an institutional question, it’s partly
also a question around cognitive lock-in of the people who were planning the electricity
system in the UK and for them a small-scale, decentralised system wasn’t really on the
horizon at all. (interviewee A4)
In Germany, complementary to the Federal Government, regional governments provided
support for smaller schemes (Ohlhorst, 2008). In addition, early inventors were able to
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secure funding from banks with a regional development remit and engaged individuals on
the basis of a strong belief that alternatives to fossil fuels and nuclear energy had to be
developed (Rave & Richter, 2008). This fostered a ‘bricolage’, incremental approach
towards technological innovation that survived the withdrawal of Central Government
funding as oil prices fell and stabilized.
This creates momentum. I know a lot of people, who, with this attitude invested in wind
power, independent of whether they are going to become rich or not. (interviewee G15)
The continuation of the decentralized, incremental, bottom-up, ‘bricolage’ approach
towards technological innovation in wind turbines put new German companies in a pos-
ition, by the early 1990s, to reach for leadership in world markets in both the production
and diffusion of wind energy technology. Later, in the early 2000s, the industry underwent
the ﬁrst wave of consolidation. Important early national players had to ﬁle for bankruptcy
and/or were bought out by international competitors. Multi-nationals like Siemens
entered the wind energy business (Bundesverband Windenergie, 2015; Ohlhorst, 2008).
In Britain, a few wind projects were realized in the early 1990s. Lacking comparable gov-
ernmental support, the remaining British producers were not able to compete in a market
with international producers (supported by their respective governments), and as a result,
the first commercial wind farms in Britain were developed with foreign turbines (intervie-
wee B8). By the early 2000s, government had discovered the political benefits of offshore
wind farms and strongly supported development in this sector leading to the growth of a
significant supply industry for offshore primarily in Scotland and to some extent in the
North East of England (Dawley et al., 2014). Key steps in the historical development of
the wind turbine industries in Germany and Britain are summarized in Figure 2.
Institutional hysteresis and impeded new technological path creation in Britain
Both this and the following section take up the theoretical argument about the important
role of institutions and their co-evolution with technological trajectories and changing cir-
cumstances. They present the analysis of this process in each case country.
This section describes the aspects of institutional hysteresis which led to the failure of
the wind turbine production path in Britain. When prompted about which formal insti-
tutions were most important for the development of the wind energy industry in
general, interviewees mostly talked about the energy law and borrowing/finance policies.
As explained above, early industrial support in Britain was directed towards large-scale
development. The introduction of the Non-Fossil-Fuel-Obligation (NFFO) in the early
1990s, designed to support struggling nuclear plants in order to privatize them eventually,
had a small tranche (less than 1%) for renewable energy projects (Taylor, 2016). Highly
engaged civil servants used a window of opportunity when the NFFO was established
to negotiate this support. While they succeeded on this occasion most of the time they
were up against the entrenched structures and vested interests of Westminster. This
reflects the important role that the historically grown, more centralized, more hierarchical
and elitist structures in Britain played for the industrial development as they hindered
their co-evolution by mindful agents like civil servants who had observed a need to
change the formal institutional framework in support of this fledgling industry for a
longer term benefit.
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Several projects were realized with NFFO contracts, but this was too late for some
British companies and competition on price made it difficult for others to compete
against international companies that were supported by their governments (interviewee
B8). Partly due to increasing international pressure and partly due to a need to occupy
new political fields, the Renewables Obligation was introduced by the incoming Labour
government (1997) in 2002. Again, the structure of the instrument did not support chal-
lengers to the incumbent industry but encouraged the existing large supply companies to
diversify their portfolios. Both the NFFO and the Renewables Obligation (RO) were there-
fore structurally set-up to favour large-scale, established industrial agents (Mitchell, 2008).
Further, interviewees reported that the sale of their Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) was
strongly encouraged by the existing tax arrangements whereas the industrialization of
their invention was not supported. This is evidence of structural support for agents to
‘externalize’ their inventions for a short-term financial benefit rather than to work on
their exploitation within Britain for a longer term benefit through new path creation
and development.
The governments have deliberately promoted and supported innovation through [tax. A]s an
inventor I only have to pay 10% capital gains tax rather than 40%, when I sell my shares.
That’s a fantastic incentive. (interviewee B2)
Figure 2. Path-dependent techno-industrial development in Britain and Germany.
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When governmental support was discontinued inventors in Britain could not rely on indi-
vidual supporters or local and regional banks to make up for the ﬁnancial shortfall in the
same way that their German counterparts could. Lack of funding opportunities beyond the
initial government support was identiﬁed by interviewees as the key reason for the discon-
tinuation of turbine production in Britain and therefore the failure of this newly created
path.
With regard to organizational forms of institutions, the firms with activities in wind
energy in Britain differed fundamentally in character from those in Germany. They
were mostly large construction and engineering consortia with little or no interest in
the actual development of an alternative energy source beyond the immediate technologi-
cal challenge and the available government funding for it (Musgrove, 2010). So, when this
funding discontinued there was a lack of individually motivated agents among the decision
makers in those firms, who would have made sure that research and development in this
sector continued. In combination with the above-mentioned lack of funding opportu-
nities, this meant that the pathway towards an active home turbine industry was blocked.
Finally, in terms of the informal institutions, it is established that what were path
changing external shocks in other countries, the nuclear incidents at Three Mile Island
(1979) and Chernobyl (1986) had a much-reduced impact on attitudes in Britain. The
same is true for the more recent incident at Fukushima (2011). The attitude towards
this industry shows a relative stability in light of these shocks in comparison to
Germany and other European countries (de Boer & Catsburg, 1988; Poortinga,
Pidgeon, Capstick, & Aoyagi, 2014). Interviewees also spoke of a close relationship of
the nuclear industry with government based on strategic recruitment of talent from
elite universities. The friendships and relationships of trust established at university
would endure and later result in powerful coalitions between those in government and
those in the nuclear industry. Observers have also long spoken of a ‘revolving door’
problem between decision-making and industry in Britain (interviewee B11; Jones,
2014; Whitley, 1974).
These findings strongly support the argument that a lack of co-evolution of formal
institutions slowed down and even hindered the development of a newly created wind
turbine technology pathway in Britain. The table in Figure 3 summarizes the findings
with regard to formal and informal institutions as well as organizational forms of
institutions.1
Institutional co-evolution enabled path development in Germany
This section describes how a process of institutional co-evolution enabled and encouraged
path development in Germany. With regard to the formal institutional framework, inter-
viewees identified the important role of the national administration for the development of
this industry. Especially the introduction of a consumer subsidy in the form of a feed in
tariff in 1990 is seen as a key step for the establishment of a market for wind energy.
Funding was made available to schemes at all scales beyond just large-scale initiatives.
In light of increased recognition of climate change and international agreements to
address this challenge, it was decided that a comprehensive renewable energy law was
necessary. Following delays and reluctance by the ministry for the economy in drafting
this new policy, this was drafted by a coalition of parliamentarians from across the political
10 C. CHLEBNA AND J. SIMMIE
spectrum. This is an example of a set of agents joining forces in response to the unsatis-
factory work to address a societal challenge by an organizational institution (the ministry).
The agents were able to form functional coalitions across the political divides using a
shared vision for the future of energy generation in Germany. These cross-party alliances
not only enabled institutional change but also guaranteed longer term stability.
In 2000, the renewable energy law (EEG) was presented which guaranteed fixed tariffs
over a set period of time and therefore created a stable environment for investment (Ohl-
horst, 2008). In addition, a pledge to exit from nuclear energy and its confirmation follow-
ing the disastrous incident in Fukushima (Japan) in 2011 institutionalized the cultural
aversion against nuclear energy felt by many citizens and led to the creation of the
policy bundle known as Energiewende, which has received attention as a vanguard of
renewable energy policy internationally.
Negative attitudes towards nuclear power were identified as a key factor in the devel-
opment of the wind energy industry by 25 out of 36 interviewees. These attitudes make
Figure 3. Institutional hysteresis and blocked new technological path creation in Britain.
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up the most important informal institution. In combination with the international rise of a
social and environmental movement, they galvanized agents across society into actions in
support of technological development and institutional change (Vasi, 2011). Agents were
personally driven to invent, invest, become activists demanding institutional change, or
change the strategic outlook of their firms in light of the increasing recognition by consu-
mers of the challenges posed by climate change. This shared sentiment united agents
across society and across the political spectrum (Oelker, 2005; interviewee G1).
As mentioned above, the character of the firms active in wind energy in Germany dif-
fered strongly from that in Britain. The development of this path was driven by relatively
small, independent firms and individually motivated agents. They were the carriers of this
process of new path creation.
No major corporations were behind this. These were passionate individuals, ingenious inven-
tors, convinced engineers, who really thought that this development was right. (interviewee
G11)
This balance between institutional co-evolution with changing circumstances and insti-
tutional stability beyond short-term political, electoral cycles created the stable framework
that enabled the development of the wind turbine path into a mature technology over the
course of about two decades.
Figure 4 summarizes the key findings with respect to the role of institutions for the
development of the wind energy industry in Germany.
Figure 4. Institutional co-evolution and new technological path creation in Germany.
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Changes to the industrial landscapes in different geo-political spaces
Different configurations of institutional ensembles in Britain and Germany led to diver-
gent path development resulting in different industrial landscapes. Institutions in
Germany were co-evolved with technological trajectories and changing circumstances
by personally motivated agents enabling the development of the wind turbine path and
manufacturing industry. In contrast, institutional hysteresis resulting from a limited per-
ception and motivation for change in Britain led to the relatively early failure of this
pathway.
Being among the first movers and therefore a leading market for a substantial period
has brought socio-economic benefit for Germany where an estimated third of all renew-
able energy systems-related employment in Europe is located (European Commission,
2014). ‘Gross’ (including the supply chain) employment in wind energy in Germany
was about four times that of Britain – around 150,000 compared with 30,000 in 2015
(Global Wind Energy Council, 2015).
Despite some uncertainty in the home market, the relative competitive advantage and
high quality of German wind energy products in the international market and the increas-
ing significance of operations and maintenance expertise means that the growth of the
sector can be expected to continue (Lehr et al., 2015). Meanwhile, in Britain, sub-sections
of the industry experienced a slight decline in employment numbers. Reasons for this are
the inconsistent signals from government and the resulting uncertainty (RenewableUK,
2015). Hence, a key challenge for both countries is to provide the institutional stability
which creates the necessary certainty for investment. This is especially relevant in light
of significant investments being made in emerging economies and the recent vote for Brit-
ain’s exit from the European Union.
Summary and conclusions
The key objective of this paper has been to explain how and why the interactions over time
between key reflexive agents and institutions in Britain and Germany contributed to the
different technological pathways created in wind power technologies in the two countries.
In the context of path dependence theory, the economies of both countries were subject to
the same severe external oil price shocks of the 1970s. But while Germany responded by
creating a new technological pathway in wind turbines over the following decades this was
not the case in Britain.
During the 1970s, the energy systems in both countries were embedded in historically
evolved and distinctive ensembles of informal, formal and organizational institutions.
Policy-making agents in both countries were locked-in to the historical techno-economic
paradigm of large-scale energy generation. As a result, the initial responses by Central and
Federal Government agents, similar to the U.S., were to fund large engineering or con-
struction organizations to build new, radical, large-scale prototype wind turbines. These
experiments were either technical failures or discontinued after oil prices stabilized.
During this early period, two key institutional differences between Britain and
Germany influenced the respective capacities of different agents in the two countries to
create a new technological pathway. The first of these were differences in their formal con-
stitutions. On the one hand, the British system of government was highly centralized and
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hierarchical with only two main parties based on a ‘first past the post’ electoral system.
This made it difficult for new social movements, in civil society, with alternative techno-
logical ideas to gain a foothold in formal government decision-making institutions.
On the other hand, after the SecondWorld War, the German constitution was reorgan-
ized as a Federal system with powers devolved to the regional Länder and a proportional
system of representation. This opened a number of avenues whereby agents could interact
with formal institutions to encourage their support for new technological path creation.
Within German civil society, like Denmark, there was already a growing belief in the
need to create alternative technological pathways to those based on fossil and nuclear
fuels. At the decentralized Länder government organization level, such agents could
seek support both from regional government itself and from regional banks, with a
local remit, for the development of small, energy schemes. Together, they provided
niche development conditions for ‘Tüftler’ (engineering tinkerers) to experiment with
small-scale wind turbines.
Thus, key institutional and agent differences already existed between Britain and
Germany in the 1970s. At the level of informal institutions in Germany, individual inven-
tors had already begun to believe in the need to create alternative technological pathways
to fossil and nuclear fuels. At the level of organizational institutions, opportunities existed
for them to interact with regional governments and banks to secure support for small-scale
experimental wind turbines. Such interactions led to niche co-evolution of both the new
technologies and their supporting institutional ensembles. Such agents and institutions
were not present in Britain.
During the 1980s, the early niche developments of the new technology were subject to
self-reinforcing elements in Germany. At the level of civil society and informal insti-
tutions, negative views of nuclear power were re-enforced by the sequence of reactor fail-
ures in America, Russia and later Japan. Such views began to find political expression due
to formal institutional arrangements such as the system of proportional representation.
These provided opportunities for upward causation with respect to changes in the devel-
opment of industrial policies by the Federal and Regional governments.
In contrast, in Britain, centralized government institutions and large-scale industrial
organizations tended to be populated by elite agents committed to nuclear power. In gov-
ernment, this commitment was partly based on the need for material for nuclear weap-
onry. In large industrial organizations, it was based on the profits to be made from
construction and energy sales. This institutional nexus was reinforced by revolving door
coalitions of pro-nuclear elite agents moving between government and industry.
A small experimental wind turbine industry was developed with the help of central gov-
ernment funding. But, in the tradition of the market-based approach to public policy
prevalent in Britain, particularly under Margaret Thatcher, the fledgling industry was
not seen as immediately profitable and so government funding was withdrawn. This illus-
trates the lack of avenues in the British institutional ensemble surrounding the creation of
new technologies for upward causation based on new ideas, generated by agents in civil
society, to gain traction among the formal and organizational institutions of government.
This presents barriers to the development of new technologies from outside the dominant
techno-economic paradigms.
The net result of these institutional differences was that by the 1990s British governmen-
tal organizational institutions had withdrawn funding from large-scale industrialists. As a
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result, they ceased R&D on new wind turbine technologies. Unlike Germany, there was no
alternative set of small-scale engineering entrepreneurs or institutional supports to con-
tinue the development of the new technological pathway. In the favoured institutional con-
ditions of free-market competition, British producers were unable to compete with foreign
manufacturers benefitting from various forms of initial government support.
During the early years of radical new technological developments, some government
support is often required to nurture the niche conditions needed as fledgling technologies
make the transitions from experimental inventions to commercial innovations. In Britain,
although some of the more technocratic civil servants recognized the need for institutional
support for alternative small-scale forms of energy generation, they were unable to over-
come the dominant institutionalized belief in price competition. The form of support
introduced, because of the failure to privatize the nuclear industry during the 1980s,
was minimal and aimed at dealing with a perceived ‘market failure’ rather than contribut-
ing to a techno-industrial strategy – only 1% of the NFFO was dedicated to renewables.
This was the result of technocratic pressure from within central government rather
than interaction between external agents, such as inventors, and government. Both the
NFFO and later the RO continued institutionalized support for large incumbent firms
capable of delivering large-scale projects.
In contrast, the introduction of a feed-in tariff in Germany did not discriminate in
favour of large firms or specific technologies. Instead, it provided an effective support
mechanism for the development of experiments in new, small and dispersed technologies.
As such, it provided possibilities for interactions between inventors and activists from civil
society and agents within the various levels of government institutions that led to the co-
evolution of those institutions in support of the creation of the new technological trajec-
tory. This evolution was given further impetus in 2000 demonstrating its ability to extend
beyond short-term electoral cycles and to provide institutional support for medium- to
long-term investment in new renewable energy technologies.
By the 2000s, the contrast between the co-evolution of long-term institutional support
for wind turbine technology in Germany and the short-term market-oriented approach
adopted in Britain was marked. In Britain, for example, because of the personal tax
system, it was advantageous for inventors to sell their IPR in new technologies rather
than to develop them into commercial innovations. This neither facilitated nor encour-
aged challenges to entrenched institutional and technological ensembles.
Meanwhile, in Germany, negative attitudes in civil society towards nuclear power had
led to the rise of environmental social movements. Thanks, in part, to the institutional and
governance arrangements, including devolved powers and proportional representation,
politicians from across the political spectrum were persuaded to take notice of such exter-
nal political pressures. Eventually, this resulted in significant formal institutional co-evol-
ution in support of the use of renewable energy technologies, a pledge to phase out the use
of nuclear power. This was formally expressed in the policy bundle ‘Energiewende’.
In conclusion, it is argued that agents in Britain were limited by historically evolved
formal and informal institutional ensembles that privileged downward causation from
the centre, in their capacity to co-evolve institutions to support fledgling technologies.
In contrast, agents in civil society in Germany were more able to stimulate upward causa-
tion and change in federal and regional institutions to encourage their co-evolution with
the creation of new wind turbine technologies.
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Further research
These findings contribute to the development of socio-institutional explanations of the
creation of new technological pathways in the context of historically evolved path-depen-
dent technological trajectories. They show, at least in the case of the creation of new wind
turbine technologies, that successful new technological path creation requires a complex
combination of agency and institutional co-evolution. This combination is required to
evolve in the context of previously historically developed institutions in which current
agents are themselves embedded. The case studies presented in this paper suggest that
such evolutions may be more likely to be created, in the first instance, by incremental
rather than radical innovation, in dispersed rather than centralized institutional
ensembles.
These findings also have implications for explanations of why new technologies spring
up in some geo-political spaces rather than others. At the level of the nation state, for
example, it is relatively easy to identify differences in their historically evolved institutional
arrangements. Given the argument that these represent important elements in previous
path-dependent technological trajectories then differences in both these initial conditions
and the possibilities for their subsequent co-evolution with technological innovation will
form a significant part of why the geography of innovation is so uneven. Detailed analyses
of institutional arrangements at lower levels of geo-political disaggregation than the nation
state could also help to explain regional or even urban differences in new technological
path creation.
The findings of this paper open a number of further research avenues. Among them is
the unsettled issue of the definition of institutions and how to investigate them empiri-
cally. Significant differences remain between different schools of thought on what consti-
tutes an institution and therefore what and which among them are key with respect to
enhanced support for their co-evolution with the creation of technological pathways.
The research reported here has pointed to the significance of ‘informal’ institutions as
sources of challenges to existing techno-economic paradigms. Through their immediate
effect on agents’ attitudes and resulting behaviours, they are seen to fundamentally
impact on processes of new technological path creation and institutional co-evolution.
Again, the inherent place-dependency of the aspects that make up ‘informal institutions’
(e.g. local and regional culture), suggests that further studies investigating the role of local
or regional institutional arrangements for path creation and development might lead to a
deeper understanding of the geography of innovation.
The paper has also suggested that opportunities for ‘upward causality’ are important in
translating those challenges into new paradigms. Further research is needed to explore in
more detail the nature of these relationships and if they apply with respect to other tech-
nologies and therefore to technological innovation systems in general. The important
question on the interaction of agency and structure has occupied sociologists for
decades and is increasingly also discussed within Economic Geography. This is particu-
larly relevant with respect to the question of how to bring about the co-evolution of
new and supporting institutions to ensure the survival and diffusion of new technologies
and industries. A key question here is how can existing institutional ensembles be con-
verted from barriers to enablers of new technological path creation? Despite admiration
for some of the long-term German organizational arrangements for technological
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advancement, the adoption of variants in Britain has often led to disappointing results. A
part of the explanation for these differences is likely to lie in, as yet, unexplained differ-
ences in the interactions between specific agents and institutions in the two countries.
Further research is needed to identify and explore these phenomena.
Finally, the role of agency itself remains relatively underexplored in Economic Geogra-
phy. Despite established recognition of the role of ‘mindful’ agents for path creation and
increasing recognition of their crucial role in regional development and processes of diver-
sification, agents themselves and the various roles, functions and types of agency are under-
conceptualized. Both conceptual and in-depth empirical contributions are needed to better
understand this most elementary component of economic development.
Note
1. Scotland represents a special outlying and devolved case within Britain where a lively supply
industry for renewable energy and in particular for wind has developed in the years since the
devolution of much of its strategic agenda through the creation of the Scottish Parliament in
1998 (Dawley et al., 2014; RenewableUK, 2016).
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